Abstract: Studies have shown that citizens' risk-perceptions and risk-assessment are affected by large scale terrorist acts. Reported evidence shows that individuals are often willing to trade-off civil liberties for enhanced security particularly as a post-terrorist attack reaction as well as adopting more conservative views. Within this strand of the literature, this paper examines whether terrorism and in particular mass-casualty terrorist attacks affect citizens' political self-placement on the left-right scale of the political spectrum. To this effect the Eurobarometer surveys for 12 European Union countries are utilized and ordered logit models are employed for the period 1985-2010 with over 230,000 observations used in the estimations. On balance, the findings reported herein seem to be pointing to a shift in respondents' self-positioning towards the right of the political spectrum.
Introduction
Terrorism has been omnipresent throughout history in various forms, shapes and intensity of activity (inter alia: Caruso and Locatelli 2014; Enders and Sandler 2012; Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze 2011; Sandler 2014; Schmid 2011) . As defined by Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley (1983) terrorism, a multifaceted phenomenon, is the "premeditated, threatened or actual use of force or violence to attain a political goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." A plethora of multidimensional issues associated with this phenomenon have been addressed, ranging from its roots, causes and geographical distribution (inter alia : Boehmer and Daube 2013; Caruso and Gavrilova 2012; Caruso and Schneider 2011; Enders and Sandler 2006; Freytag et al. 2011; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2013; Helfstein 2014; Krieger and Meierrieks 2011; Li 2005; Malečková and Stanišić 2014; Mascarenhas and Sandler 2014; Meierrieks 2012; Piazza 2006 Piazza , 2008 , to its political and socioeconomic consequences (inter alia: Abadie and Gardeazabal 2008; Adam and Blomberg 2010; Bassil 2014; Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides 2004; Brück 2007; Caruso and Locatelli 2014; Stutzer 2007, 2009; Sandler 2008, 2009; Lis 2014) , to policies and their effectiveness in thwarting the terrorist threat (inter alia: Brandt and Sandler 2009; Drakos and Giannakopoulos 2009; Sandler 1993, 2000; Enders, Sandler, and Cauley 1990; Frey and Luechinger 2004; Kollias et al. 2009 ).
In the broader spirit of such studies, this paper addresses a similar question that is comparatively under-investigated, namely the effects of terrorism attacks on political ideology. Using peoples' self-placement on the left-right political scale as an indicator of political ideology (Cohrs et al. 2005) , it examines whether terrorism affects their political self-positioning just as it apparently does with electoral choices and attitudes towards security enhancing measures and/or terrorist thwarting policies. Essentially, the issue investigated here, is whether terrorist events, and in particular mega-terrorist attacks that cause widespread damages and casualties attracting as a consequence intense and widespread media attention worldwide, bring about an identifiable shift in political beliefs and attitudes as these are reflected and captured by the individuals' self-placement on the political spectrum. To this effect, the paper is structured as follows. A brief literature review is offered in the next section and in Section 3 the dataset used and the econometric methodology employed are presented. The results are presented and discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes the paper.
Background discussion
Terrorism is widely regarded as a public bad presenting a major security and political challenge for open societies. Its costs and effects go well beyond the direct damages inflicted by a terrorist attack including the loss of life and injuries (inter alia: Caruso and Locatelli 2014; Enders and Sandler 2012; Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer 2007; Sandler 2014) . Terrorist activity, and in particular the need to defend against it, protect societies from the omnipresent threat and eventually thwart it, often imposes tough choice dilemmas between two public goods: liberties vs. security, with the latter potentially involving curtailing civil liberties that epitomize the political achievements and progress of contemporary open socie-ties (inter alia : Dragu 2011; Frey and Luechinger 2004; Kurrid-Klitgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen 2006; Piazza and Walsh 2009) .
The left-right schema is widely accepted as encapsulating and classifying ideologies, political orientation, values, partisan choices and loyalties, political behavior and policy preferences. Indeed, an individual's positioning on this spectrum is a reflection of his/her social cognition (inter alia: Freire 2006 Freire , 2007 Kroh 2007; Noelle-Neumann 1998) . Clearly, a cohort of factors influence and determine such self-placements by citizens on the left-right dimension. They include ideological leanings and values, political preferences and class perceptions, cultural attitudes, social and demographic characteristics, as well as an individual's current economic circumstances (inter alia: de Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013; Economou, Gavroglou, and Kollias 2013; Freire 2006 Freire , 2007 . A growing body of literature addresses the relationship between political ideology and political engagement on the one hand and violent events such as terrorism and civil wars on the other. For instance, as Blattman (2009) argues war violence, witnessing or experiencing violent acts lead to increased political participation and engagement.
Given that terror and in particular mega terrorist events inflict extensive damages and, most important, cause massive fatalities and casualties, it is possible that this could induce more fundamental changes in political perspectives given the recent evidence cited above that points to increased public support for more stringent security measures as well as the willingness to trade civil liberties for security. Hence such shifts in attitudes and preferences may also reflect more profound changes in political beliefs, ideological standing and, consequently, self-identification on the left-right scale. If indeed this is the case, one may intuitively expect a right-wing shift along the political spectrum given that the right is more associated with tighter and stringent security policies and a more stern approach to threats. Nevertheless, one cannot exclude the possibility of a movement towards the opposite end of the spectrum. Clearly, such a shift should not be interpreted as condoning terrorism but rather as indicating a strengthening belief that the only means to uproot terrorism is not through thicker security webs but by addressing its root-causes in a systematic and sustained way that will gradually starve terrorist organizations from their recruiting pools. Hence a leftward shift could be the result of a conviction that one needs to address some of the rootcauses of terrorism such as for instance injustice, oppression, poverty, political repression, ethnic conflict and state failure (Bali 2007; Caruso and Gavrilova 2012; Caruso and Schneider 2011; Freytag et al. 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks 2011) . In line with the above, Huddy (2013) argues that the feelings generated from a terrorist attack may differ greatly and as such, they may induce different reactions. For instance anger increases public support for the adoption of drastic and aggressive actions, while anxiety feelings may induce a different public stance vis-à-vis the choice of policy responses. In other words, the public feelings generated after a terrorist attack can induce different shifts in political ideology, depending on the public feelings that prevail among the population, namely group anger or fear and anxiety.
A comparatively limited number of studies have addressed the effect of terrorism on political self-placement. The theories examining the relationship between political attitudes and terrorism originate from the psychology and political science fields. An expanding literature attempts to capture the theoretical framework inducing people to alter their beliefs after a terrorism event. To this end, Cognitive Motivation theory explains the change in individual political attitudes as a response to threat through the motivation for cognition (Jost, Glaser, and Kruglanski 2003; Thórisdóttir 2007) . Individuals with low motivation to understand and copy with the information related to the terrorist attack are more likely to support conservative, traditional ideologies that place emphasis on social stability. A variable found to theoretically link political ideology with motivated cognition is the individual need for closure. Empirical studies consistently found that the need for closure is positively associated with right-wing preferences (Kossowska and Van Hiel 2003) . Right-wing political self-placement is closely related, although it is not synonymous, with political conservatism and as such it may be affected by the threat of terrorism. Individual political ideology, usually approximated by the left-right political self-placement, can explain support for restrictive civil liberties policies and conservative ideology, as well as right-wing authoritarianism (Cohrs et al. 2005) . In a similar vein, other studies have focused on the determinants of authoritarianism, a concept describing a variety of individual attitudes and beliefs, such as support for restrictive and potentially anti-democratic measures, right-wing placement (Cohrs et al. 2005; Thórisdóttir 2007 ). It has been argued that threatening circumstances may induce individuals to embrace authoritarianism. A number of psychological experiments have shown that individuals tend to embrace political conservatism during periods of increased threats (Thórisdóttir 2007) . Similarly, Terror Management theory postulates that when events such as mega terrorist attacks remind individuals of the possibility of their own death, they would tend to embrace more conservative policies and attitudes (Landau et al. 2004 ). Jost, Glaser, and Kruglanski (2003) argues that political conservatism entails certain individual beliefs about the world. Conservatives (or individuals of right-wing ideology) tend to view the world as more threatening than liberals (or of leftwing ideology) and they support policies and actions that facilitate the sustainment of stability and hierarchy. Similarly, the Uncertainty-Threat model of political conservatism argues that individuals can embrace right-wing attitudes in periods of increased threats in an effort to restore the (subjective) sense of control and the need for order and certainty (Jost, Glaser, and Kruglanski 2003; Jost et al. 2007 ). In particular, the threat of terrorism is associated with elevated feelings of loss of control and uncertainty. Hence, there is an increased probability that individuals will adjust and change their socio-political attitudes and preferences in order to regain control. This mechanism is mainly present during threats that are beyond individual control and therefore, cannot be managed directly by them (Jost et al. 2007 ). In a nutshell, such theoretical approaches, a detailed review of which can be found in Thórisdóttir (2007) and Jost et al. (2007) , argue that psychological and emotional factors can predict individual position in the left-right spectrum.
As shown by a number of studies, terrorist activity or indeed simply the threat of a terrorist incident often has profound effects on the general public's risk perceptions and attitudes, causing increased insecurity sentiments that potentially impact daily social and economic behavior and generally adversely affecting subjective well-being and life satisfaction (Brück, Llussá, and Tavares 2011; Drakos and Müller 2014; Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer 2009) . As already pointed out, it has been shown in a number of studies that terrorist attacks, especially mega-events with significant losses of life and capital that rattle society, bring about a shift towards the support of more conservative policies such as tighter security measures and the concomitant trade-off with civil liberties while voting behavior is also affected with more conservative parties reaping the electoral benefits in most cases (inter alia: Berrebi and Klor 2008; Bozzoli and Müller 2011; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede 2006; Finseraas and Listhaug 2013) .
A particular strand of this wide ranging and growing literature has focused its attention on how terrorist events affect the political and legislative process and peoples' attitudes, beliefs and electoral behavior particularly in countries that have fallen victims to terrorism either in the form of systematic terrorist campaigns or from mega-attacks (inter alia: Berrebi and Klor 2008; Dragu 2011; Drakos and Müller 2011; Stutzer 2007, 2009; Kurrid-Klitgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen 2006; Piazza and Walsh 2009; Sharvit et al. 2010) . For instance, Bozzoli and Müller (2011) , using the 2005 London attack as a case study, find that peoples' risk-perceptions and risk-assessment are affected by such large scale terrorist acts and, as a consequence, individuals are more willing to trade-off civil liberties for enhanced security. Changes towards more conservative attitudes are recorded in a quasi-experimental study by Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede (2006) Finseraas and Listhaug (2013) to assess the impact of terrorism on public opinion. An increase in the fear of terrorism is identifiable in the analysis along with indications that the event in question caused a conservative shift in the left-right division of the political spectrum. Findings reported by studies such as Berrebi and Klor (2008) indicate that electorate choices are sensitive and seem to respond to terrorist activity, with significant vote shifts in favor of more conservative right-wing parties. Similar influence on the 2004 election outcome in Spain is found by Bali (2007) but in this case causing a shift towards the opposite direction on the political party spectrum in terms of the ballot choices made by the electorate.
In the broader spirit of such studies, herein we address the question of whether political self-placement is affected by terrorist events. As seen above, the effects of terrorism on voting behavior have been investigated for a number of incidents. Voting behavior and ideological self-placement are two concepts that are closely related, but are not synonymous. Political ideology is a significant predictor of voting behavior, so understanding the driving forces of political ideology per se is important and can help in shedding light into the determinants of voting behavior. As to whether political self-placement is a valid tool of political ideology, this measure is the most widely used in empirical studies of political ideology (Feldman and Johnston 2014) and it has been found to be both valid and reliable (Jost 2006; Thórisdóttir 2007) . Jost, Federico, and Napier (2009) argue that historically the left-right categorization continues to attribute the same meaning in values such as "leftists" and "rightists" in different countries, encompassing two core aspects: social change vs. tradition and rejection vs. acceptance of inequality. Furthermore, a robust relationship between this measure and voting patterns, as well as with other political variables has been systematically established in empirical research (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; Thórisdóttir 2007) . Finally, the left-right divide is widely used by the media, in political debates and decision making (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) .
Utilising the Eurobarometer Surveys where respondents are asked to place themselves on the left-right ideological scale we explore the question at hand. In the next section we proceed to empirically examine whether or not terrorism causes more profound changes in political beliefs and ideological standing in the case of 12 European Union countries. European countries are no strangers to terrorist activity. Europe has been the birth place of some of the best known terrorist groups in the world -such as the Provisional IRA, INLA, ETA, Action Directe, Brigate Rosse, N17, RAF -as well as the venue for attacks of transnational terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida, Black September, Hezbollah and the Abu Nidal Organization. Excluding the damages to capital, property and infrastructures, the operation of both the homegrown as well as the transnational terrorist groups has over the years resulted in tens of thousands of deaths, maiming and injuries for civilians and security personnel alike.
The methodology

Dataset and variables
The data used to test the hypothesis are drawn from the Eurobarometer Surveys. 1 They take place more than once each year and they gather information on a representative sample of individuals. The dataset offers a wide range of information concerning individual demographic and socioeconomic characteristics as well as social values self-placements. Unfortunately, not the same individuals are questioned in each wave. The question at hand is investigated for 12 European Union countries -Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom -over the period 1985-2010 utilizing individuals' responses recorded in the Eurobarometer Surveys.
Therefore, an independent panel totaling over 230,000 observations is constructed for the period 1985-2010 for 12 European Union countries -Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 2 Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom -based on the availability of information on the main variable of interest here, namely individual political self-placement. In the surveys, a random sample of individuals in each country is asked to respond to the following question: -"In political matters people talk of "The Left" and "The Right." How would you place your views on this scale?."
The respondents' answers are drawn from a ten-response scale with the extreme values being "1: Left" and "10: Right". Hence, respondents with high rankings on the left-right political scale are considered as more conservative than the rest.
In addition, a number of individual demographic and economic characteristics are controlled for, as possible determinants of individual self-placement on the political scale. Such characteristics are: age, gender, marital status, educational variables and occupational status. Unfortunately, there is no available information for all the years regarding the economic characteristics of the respondents. Therefore, GDP growth rate and annual investment growth rates are also included in the regressions. The data on GDP growth rate are drawn from the OECD database.
3 Data on annual gross capital formation growth rates (%) are obtained from the World Bank Database.
In addition, it is expected that the political color of the party that is in government could also affect individual political values. Thus, a dummy variable indicating the political placement of the incumbent political party is also included in the regressions. The data on political party orientation are drawn from the Political Institutions Database. 4 In order to examine the central hypothesis of the paper, that is whether terrorist attacks affect individual political self-placement, the main independent variables of interest are mega terrorist events that had a severe impact approximated by the number of casualties they caused and as a consequence the attention they attracted. The main criterion for the inclusion of the specific attacks in the study is whether there was a wave available in the Eurobarometer surveys shortly after the attack -up to 3 months following the event -so that any impact on the self-placement positioning of respondents would be statistically traceable. The underlying assumption here is that, as time elapses, any potential effect either withers away or that noise from other factors that potentially affect this placement overshadows the effect and hinders traceability. It is hoped that in this manner we will be able to capture any effect terrorist attacks have on political self-placement values. For example, in order to examine the impact of 9/11, information for 2001 was drawn from the survey of the period 17/09/2011-26/10/2011. The only exception to this rule, were the 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid where there is a gap of approximately 7 months between the event and the first survey that followed.
The terrorist incidents that are examined in this study are presented in more detail in Table 3 , along with the respective waves that were utilized from the Eurobarometer survey for the years examined. The events are drawn from the Enders and Sandler (2012) mass-casualty terrorist attacks list and, as it can be observed in the relevant table, include 9/11; the 2004 and 2005 bombings in Madrid and London; the 1995 Oklahoma truck bomb; the 1998 al-Qaida attacks against the 3 Other macroeconomic indicators, such as country unemployment rates and inflation that could possibly exert an influence upon political self-placement have been also included in the regression models. However, they were highly correlated with GDP, therefore they were excluded from the regressions. For example, the correlation between GDP and unemployment rate reached even 91% and between GDP and inflation 86% at the country level. Despite the above, the main results of interest remain the same, even with the inclusion of the above mentioned variables. GDP per capita was also examined alternatively to GDP growth rates but the results were once again similar. 4 Details on the variables' descriptions and means are provided in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively. The data on Germany includes former East Germany from 1990 onwards. Enders and Sandler (2012) . The dataset is constructed in such a way as to draw information from respondents a few months after the terrorist attack has taken place. Individual information on periods where no major terrorist attacks are recorded is drawn between September to December for each respective year. Data on the Nationalities of the victims are drawn from the Global Terrorism Database and various internet sources (international press, victims memorial, Wikipedia, etc.).
the attacks coincide with the survey waves, the sample of respondents that participated in the autumn/winter waves is used for each respective country.
Econometric modelling
Due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, ordered logit models are used in the analysis as they are the obvious choice when dealing with ordinal dependent variables (Verbeek 2004 
Where * i y is the latent, continuous measure of political self placement of individual i, x i is the vector of explanatory variables included in the estimations, β is the vector of parameters to be estimated (country and year dummies are also included as controls) and ε i is the random error term that is assumed to follow the logistic distribution. With 
Where the μ i 's are thresholds to be estimated along with the estimated parameters β. The method of estimation is maximum likelihood. 5 The effects of terrorism in the ordered logit regressions are controlled with dummies taking the value of one if a terrorist event took place shortly before the period of examination and zero otherwise. Another advantage in favour of logistic regression models is the interpretation of the coefficients based on the odds ratio. It provides the estimated change in the odds of Y being equal or higher than μ i (versus the remaining categories of μ i ) for a one unit increase in the j-th regressor (Gujarati 2003) .
It was also deemed to be interesting to investigate whether the independent variables exert a differential impact upon individual political self-placement, for each broad category of individuals of "left," "centrist" or "right" political 5 In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity that might affect the estimated parameters we also estimate heterogeneous choice models (Williams 2009 (Williams , 2010 . Although there exists unobserved heterogeneity that affects the estimates, the results remain similar. positioning respectively. Based on Eurobarometers' recoding in a three-point scale, individuals are categorised as follows: "1-4: individuals of left political selfplacement," "5-6: individuals of center political self-placement," "7-10: individuals of right political self-placement." Logit models were also estimated separately for each of the three categories, respectively. The results are presented for the overall sample in Table 4 . Furthermore, in case the effects of the terrorist attacks vary depending whether they took place within or outside the EU area (Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev 2011) , the results reported in Table 4 are categorised between domestic and international terrorism hits.
Before proceeding with the estimations and the presentation of the results in the next section, looking at the descriptive statistics of the key variable of interest for our purposes here (Table 2), they reveal that the mean value of individual political self-placement is broadly similar in all the participating countries. The lowest value (indicating more leftist political values) is observed for Spain and France while the highest value (indicating more right-conservative political values) is observed for Ireland, followed by Denmark and Greece. Based on the mean values presented in Table 1 , the mean age of participants in all countries is at the middle level of the lifecycle, ranging from approximately 44 years in the case of Ireland to 48 years in Denmark and Germany. Finally, the highest GDP growth rates for the period examined are observed for Ireland and the lowest for Italy. Investment growth rates are found to be highest in Portugal and lowest in Germany.
The findings
The first column of the estimated models in Table 4 presents the results of the pooled dataset regressions. Regarding the main relationship of interest, i.e., that between political self-placement and terrorist events; the findings show that all mass-casualty terrorist attacks are positively and significantly associated with political self-placement. In particular, all the terrorist events that are included in the study are associated with an increased probability of respondents to report higher values in the political self-placement scale (i.e., more conservative values). Among those are the defining events of the 9/11 attacks and the 2005 London bombings by home grown terrorists with al-Qaida ties; the Oklahoma City truck bomb attack in 1995 by Timothy McVeigh; the 1985 downing of the Air-India 747 Boeing by Sikh extremists and the barricade hostage seizure of a Moscow Theatre by Chechen terrorists in 2002. Also noteworthy is that the August 1998 al-Qaida bomb attacks against the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam in Table 4 The effect of terrorist attacks on political self-placement in the 12 E.U. countries, 1985-2010. Indicates ***significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. All regressions are estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
Indep. variables Ordered logit models, odds ratio
( Tanzania which were very important both in terms of victims as well as in terms of the symbolic and political importance of the targets, also exert a significant effect. The broader picture emerging from the estimations indicates that domestic terrorist incidents exert a stronger effect upon political self-placement. In detail, the terrorist hit of 1985 is associated with an increase in the odds of being in the extreme right of the political self-placement scale (versus the remaining categories) of about 57%. Similarly, the terrorist attacks that occurred in London in 2005 are associated with an increase in the odds of being in the extreme right of the political self-placement scale (versus the remaining categories) of about 27%.
The categorization between domestic and international terrorism attacks did not yield significantly different results. While the strongest change in political ideology is associated with the 1985 terrorist event, we do not observe the same effects in magnitude for the rest of the domestic terrorist incidents. Perhaps this finding has to do with the fact that all attacks are considered as mega-events that draw wide media coverage. A finding worth pointing out is the weaker quantitative impact in the case of the two major terrorist attacks that occurred in 2004. The first one is the Madrid bomb attacks while the second one is the Beslan event in September 2004. It seems that these two terrorist attacks are associated with an increase in the odds of being in the extreme right of the political self-placement scale (versus the remaining categories) of about 15%, which is smaller in magnitude than the respective effect of the 2005 London bombings and the much older airplane bombing in 1985.
In the case of the 2004 Madrid events a tentative explanation for this weaker finding may be the large time window between the occurrence of the event and the time of the survey (approximately 7 months). Unfortunately, there was no wave available from the Eurobarometer Surveys shortly after this attack and therefore these findings may not lead to reliable inferences although one cautious assertion would be that the shockwaves of terrorist attacks do not last long and wither away in a rather short period of time. Additionally, it took place in a geographically distant area from Europe. Nevertheless it did capture intense worldwide attention and world media coverage given the number of children that died in this attack by the Chechen rebels. An interesting explanation may be found in the study of Huddy (2013) . He argues that the public feelings generated in every terrorist attack can induce different support for actions and policies. In detail, while the 2001 terrorism attack generated mainly feelings of anger among the public, and consequently, increased support for war and restrictive liberties policies, the 2004 Madrid bombing attacks increased feelings of fear and anxiety among the public and induced avoidance behaviours. Perhaps this explains the absence of findings that point to a shift towards right-wing ideologies.
Turning to the effects of the international terrorism attacks (i.e., those that occurred outside the EU area) a strong positive relationship is observed for all of them. For instance, the 9/11 attacks are associated with an increase in the probability of being in the right end (versus the remaining categories) of the political self-placement spectrum by approximately 27%. Similarly, for the 2002 event the respective odds are approximately 29%. Overall, in this category of events, the largest in magnitude coefficient is observed for the 1989 incident while the lower for the 1995 attack.
The last three columns of Table 4 examine the relationship between the terrorist incidents and the political values for the aggregate categories of the "leftists," "centrists" and "rightists," respectively. This way we can identify in a more detailed manner the differential correlation between the independent variables of terrorism attacks and political ideology. In broad terms, a movement is observed from the "left" and the "centric" scales towards the "right" scales of political positioning. This finding seems to arise from a movement away from "leftist" and "centrist" political values when we compare the estimated correlations for these episodes towards more "rightist" values. However, this "movement" is less pronounced when we look at the leftists and seems to increase in magnitude as we observe the centrists and the rightists. In particular, only the terrorist attacks of 1985, 1993, 2001 and 2002 are associated with a lower probability of the respondents to report "leftist" political values. In this case, the probabilities range from 13% to 11%. For the "centrists" sample, all terrorism attacks are associated with lower probabilities to report "centric" political ideology, with the probabilities ranging from 31% to 10%. Finally, all terrorism attacks are associated with increased probabilities for the respondents to report more conservative (right-wing) ideologies. In all three samples, the greatest in magnitude coefficient is observed once again for the 1985 terrorist incident.
As Jost, Glaser, and Kruglanski (2003) argue political conservatism is not reliant solely upon individual characteristics and psychological predisposition and as such, it may be affected by system instability or other threats. Political ideology is a set of beliefs that provide interpretation of the social environment and the way it should be structured (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009) . If they are affected by situational factors as well, then individuals exhibiting a change in their political ideology due to an eminent threat, they must have accepted to a certain degree the different set of values offered by liberalist or conservative ideology respectively (Thórisdóttir 2007) . This can perhaps explain why, as we move from the "leftist" sample to the "rightist" sample, we observe a greater correlation with a shift in political ideology, since "leftists" should in principle be less inclined to accept conservatism actions as an alternative than "centrists" and so on.
The executive party's political orientation seems to also affect significantly individual political values. In detail, having a right-wing executive party is associated with higher probability for individuals to report higher values on the political self-placement scale (i.e., towards the right wing) in comparison to periods that the executive party is center-or left-wing. Economic conditions seem to also affect political self-placement. An increase in GDP growth rate is associated with lower probabilities for respondents to report conservative political values. To put it differently, during periods of economic expansion, respondents are more likely to report lower political placement values, i.e., more towards the center/left of the scale. On the other hand, during periods of economic downturn and recession, respondents may become more conservative due to the higher probability to report more conservative values in the political self-placement scale. Investment growth rates are insignificant in all the regressions but its inclusion does not impair the results.
Several other demographic and social factors, namely age, education, marital status and gender are also found, as one would intuitively expect, to affect political values. Worth pointing out is the effect of the occupational status and education upon political ideology. Based on the aggregated results (first column of Table 4 ) all occupational categories, except for blue-collar positions, are associated with a higher probability to report conservative values in the political self-placement scale vis-à-vis the unemployed. This indicates that labour market participation can be significantly correlated with self-reported political ideology with the unemployed individuals leaning towards the left scale of the political values scale. The stronger effects are observed for the self-employed followed by the individuals outside the labour force (i.e., the inactive individuals). The effect of the educational level upon political self-placement also reveals an interesting pattern. Having completed full-time education between 16 and 19 years of age is associated with a higher probability of reporting values to the right of the political self-placement scale (versus the remaining categories) in comparison to the reference group of individuals who finished full-time education before 15 years of age. On the contrary, having completed full-time education after the age of 20 years is associated with a lower probability of 6% to report values in the right of the political self-placement scale (versus the remaining categories) in comparison to the reference group. It would appear that the educational level is inversely related with the probability of reporting more rightist political values.
Concluding remarks
In light of recent evidence indicating that terrorism affects peoples' attitudes, beliefs and electoral behavior generally causing a shift towards the right of the political spectrum, this paper, using 12 European Union countries as a case study, set out to examine whether major terrorist episodes affect citizens' political selfplacement on the left-right scale. To the best of our knowledge, this issue has not been addressed on this scale before. Using citizens' self-positioning as this is recorded in the Eurobarometer surveys ordered logit models were employed with a total of over 230,000 observations for all 12 countries of the sample that spans the years 1985-2010. The choice of mass-casualty terrorist events that were drawn from Enders and Sandler (2012) and used in the empirical investigation here, was very much dictated by compatibility issues with the available survey waves in order to statistically capture the possible effect on self-positioning by the respondents.
Broadly speaking, the estimations yielded consistent evidence. All 11 major terrorist events for which a corresponding survey wave was available soon after the incident had occurred, were found to be strongly associated with respondents' self-placement on the left-right political scale. These included the defining events of the 9/11 attacks, the 2005 London bombings as well as the Oklahoma City attack and the Madrid 2004 event. If a broad generalisation of the obtained results is attempted, then, on balance, it appears that major terrorist attacks (given the selection constraints mentioned above) are associated with a rightward shift on the political spectrum as this is recorded in the Eurobarometer Surveys. The findings are broadly in line and compatible with the reported results by other studies that have focused on similar research questions. They report a post-terrorist attack willingness to trade civil liberties for more security, adoption of more conservative views and attitudes as well as a vote shift in favour of more conservative political parties. Of particular interest are the patterns depicted when examining separately the "leftists," "centrists" and "rightists," respectively. It seems that terrorism attacks are related with a movement from the more liberal ideological positions to more conservative political values. This movement seems to be more intense as we move further up the political values ladder, i.e., is more intense for "centrists" than for "leftists." As an overall general conclusion, it seems that terrorism is associated with a shift to conservatism with the concomitant effects on voting patterns and political decision-making.
